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Petroleum Industry in Nigeria
Alison Lindsay Shinsato *
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

¶4

In an era of increased globalization, transnational corporations (“TNCs”) have
grown in number and in power. A significant portion of modern economic development
occurs through TNCs that, in an effort to maximize profit, move to developing countries.
Among the attractions to TNCs of such regions are lax environmental regulations and
what amounts to tolerance of human rights violations. 1 TNCs have increased the rate of
man-made environmental destruction and concomitant harm to humans. Indigenous
groups are often affected the most severely; their sustainable lifestyle becomes
impossible as natural resources are decimated by TNCs.
Host countries often do not have the means or the will to implement and enforce
strict standards on TNCs. Moreover, governments often regard economic investment by
TNCs and, in turn, the development of the host country’s economy as of primary
importance, such that concern for the environment falls by the wayside. 2 The host
country population is often powerless in the face of the tremendous financial and political
clout the TNCs wield, and, moreover, the current body of international law fails to
provide victims with an adequate legal remedy against TNCs.
Under current international law, TNCs are not liable for environmental destruction
or the concomitant human rights abuses. Current international human rights law,
environmental law, and economic law do not provide an avenue of legal redress for
victims of environmental destruction. Environmental harm to individuals is not a cause
of action under current international law; such harm must be connected to a substantive
right and this requirement leads courts and commissions into an undefined area of law. 3
The dynamic nature of human rights demands the continuous evolution of
international laws to maintain relevance in a rapidly changing world. 4 The increase in
environmental destruction and concomitant human rights violations requires that human
rights law be extended to include environmental protections as a way to improve people’s
lives through preservation of the environment. While international human rights law and

*

J.D. 2005.
Joe W. (Chip) Pitts III, The First UN Social Forum: History and Analysis, 31 DENV. J. INT ’L L. &
POL’Y 297, 299 (2002).
2
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 368 (1995).
3
Joshua P. Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations,
and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT ’L L.J. 261, 297 (1997).
4
Laura S. Ziemer, Application in Tibet of the Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, 14
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 233, 275 (2001).
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environmental law developed discrete structures, recently, however, international
organizations have started to describe the intricate relationship between human rights and
environmental health in a number of treaties, covenants, and declarations. This merger
will strengthen both fields by increasing international focus, accountability for
environmental destruction and human rights violations, and universality of environmental
standards.
This paper focuses on Nigeria as a specific example of environmental destruction
and concomitant human rights violations caused by oil TNCs. The Nigeria model is used
to describe an environmental human rights problem and illustrate the objectives of
environmental human rights as well as some solutions to achieve these goals. Within this
context, this paper outlines the development of environmental human rights and current
legal mechanisms available to address violations of these rights: domestic law,
universally recognized human rights law, and United States law. These three must
necessarily be viewed as short-term solutions while affording the international
community time to develop an applicable body of law centered on the right to a healthy
environment. The adoption of stricter universal standards of corporate liability and
concomitant penalties will encourage corporations to adopt more sustainable business
practices and thereby reduce human rights violations perpetrated through environmental
destruction.
II. THE PROBLEM
A. Globalization and Environmental Degradation

¶6

¶7

Globalization can positively transform societies by promoting economic growth
and increasing the standard of living. 5 However, globalization can also negatively impact
societies through environmental degradation and resulting human rights violations.
Causes of environmental destruction roughly divide into natural and man- made. A
number of actors, including nation states, domestic populations, and corporations,
contribute to this problem. This paper focuses on TNCs and, in particular, their
contribution to man- made environmental destruction and the concomitant effects on
humans.
Environmental degradation and its effects on humans are of global concern. Many
populations are victims of environmental degradation due to global industrialization and
the exploitation of developing countries by TNCs seeking cost-effective investments. A
large percentage of TNCs are based in wealthy developed countries but invest in
developing countries where the environmental la ws are less stringent. A number of cases
in US courts indicate that some TNCs degrade the environment and as a result, may
violate certain human rights. 6 Owing to jurisdictional disputes that make such redress

5

See, e.g., Roni N. Halabi, Note, Stability in the Middle East Through Economic Development: An
Analysis of the Peace Process, Increased Agricultural Trade, Joint Ventures, and Free Trade Agreements,
2 DRAKE J. A GRIC. L. 275, 278-79 (1997); Maria Eugenia Padula, Article, Mexico’s Part in the Neoliberal
Project, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. INT ’L L. & POL’Y 1, 6 (2002).
6
Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998) (Newman, J.), rev’g Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F.
Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (ATCA) on remand, 139 F. Supp. 2d 139 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
142 F. Supp. 2d 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing complaint); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d
161 (5th Cir. 1999); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
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attempts ineffective, it is necessary for the international community to create legal
mechanisms to hold corporations accountable for environmental destruction and human
rights violations.
¶8
Economic globalization generally focuses on economic efficiency with the goal of
maximizing wealth and is structured around the concept of humans as purely economic
beings. 7 In this pure economic model, efficiency is the only value of relevance, and
protection of the environment and humans reduces efficiency. 8 Thus, the economic
reality is that the cost of goods such as oil is reflected in the degradation of the
environment and population of the host country, rather than in the price to the end
consumer of the goods and services. 9
¶9
Environmental destruction leaves local populations with two basic options: a) to
leave the degraded environment for a more habitable place and become environmental
refugees 10 or environmentally displaced people; 11 or b) to remain in the degraded
environment and risk increased morbidity and mortality through exposure to pollution
and depleted, degraded, or contaminated food and water sources. Generally, “[t]he worst
victims of environmental harm tend also to be those with the least political clout, such as
members of racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, or those who are geographically
isolated from the locus of political power within their country.”12
¶10
Neither of the above options is ideal as both leave communities and individuals in
worse conditions than before the environmental destruction occurred. Furthermore,
international law is currently organized in such a manner as to exclude such victims from
international aid. In order to aid these people, the international community should meld
and balance the goals of the proponents of economic development and of the advocates of
environmental and human rights in order to prevent future environmental destruction and
its concomitant negative effects on humans as well as to aid those affected by
environmental destruction.

7
See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE W ORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 8-9 (2d ed. 1989); Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Taking Ethics
Seriously: Economic and Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 671, 671 (1993).
8
Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT ’L & COMP . L. REV. 273,
286 (2002).
9
Eaton, supra note 3, at 274.
10
A refugee is a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country. . .” Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (July 28,
1951). Current refugee policy excludes those fleeing for other reasons including environmental disaster or
degradation. Many have suggested that the definition is outdated and must evolve with changing
circumstances and demands. See generally Jeanhee Hong, Refugees of the 21st Century: Environmental
Injustice, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 323 (2002); Jessica B. Cooper, Note, Environmental Refugees:
Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Definition, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 480 (1998); Gregory S. McCue,
Environmental Refugees: Applying International Environmental Law to Involuntary Migration, 6 GEO.
INT ’L ENVTL. L. REV. 151 (1993).
11
See generally Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Representative of
the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons: Questions and Answers about
IDPs, at http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/idp/index.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
12
Caroline Dommen, Claiming Environmental Rights: Some Possibilities Offered by the United
Nations’ Human Rights Mechanisms, 11 GEO. INT ’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (1998).
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B. Transnational Corporations

¶11

A TNC is “a national company in two or more countries operating in association,
with one controlling the other in whole or in part.”13 In both the US courts14 and the
International Court of Justice, 15 a TNC’s nationality is determined according to its
country of incorporation. Nearly 37,000 TNCs existed worldwide in 1990; 16 this
increased to 65,000 TNCs with more than 850,000 foreign subsidiaries and affiliates in
2002.17
¶12
Poorer nations turn to TNCs to encourage international investment in hopes of
improving the local economy. In turn, TNCs are attracted to the opportunity to lower
production costs through lenient environmental standards and cheap labor. 18 However, as
domestic economies have globalized and global economies have modernized, the
economic and political clout of the TNCs has become so huge – the GDP of many TNCs
is larger than the GDPs of many small nations 19 – that sovereign states have lost their
positions of dominance in the global economy. The TNCs are now so powerful that
governments are unable to stop exploitation in their own states. 20
¶13
Despite their enormous influence and their significant role in the degradation and
destruction of the environment which subsequently harms human populations, TNCs are
not yet signatories to binding international instruments. 21 Virtually unrestrained by
international instruments and domestic laws, TNCs are safe from liability for
environmental destruction and resultant human rights violations. Globalization has thus
“created powerful non-state actors that may violate human rights in ways that were not
contemplated during the development of the modern human rights movement.”22

13

THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 30 (1992).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. E (1987).
15
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5, 1970).
16
Robert J. Fowler, International Environmental Standards for Transnational Corporations, 25 ENVTL.
L. 1, 1 (1995).
17
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2002:
Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2002 (Sept. 17, 2002)
[hereinafter World Investment Report].
18
Douglas S. Morrin, Book Review, People before Profits: Pursuing Corporate Accountability for
Labor Rights Violations Abroad Through the Alien Torts Claims Act, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 427, 428
(2000).
19
Lisa Lambert, At the Crossroads of Environmental and Human Rights Standards: Aguinda v. Texaco,
Inc. Using the Alien Tort Claims Act to Hold Multinational Corporate Violators of International Laws
Accountable in United States Courts, 10 J. TRANSNAT ’L L. & POL’Y 109, 110 (2000); Douglass Cassel,
Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT ’L L.J. 1963, 1984 (1996)
(“The eve of the twenty-first century is marked by economic globalization, expansion in the number of free
enterprise economies, and by privatization. As responsibilities thus shift from the public to the private
sector and especially to multinationals, governments and intergovernmental organizations wield
correspondingly less power. Even where governments have the political will, they may lack effective
power to safeguard basic rights, a power which increasingly, for an important spectrum of rights, rests in
the private hand of multinational corporations.”).
20
“Shell, surely, has never hesitated to use its influence on matters of Nigerian tax policy,
environmental rules, labor laws and trade policies.” Shell Game in Nigeria, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1995, at
14.
21
Lauren A. Mowery, Earth Rights, Human Rights: Can International Environmental Human Rights
Affect Corporate Accountability?, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 343, 358 (2002).
22
Shelton, supra note 8, at 279.
14
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Some organizations and scholars have suggested that TNCs create voluntary codes
of conduct as a way to curb environmental destruction and human rights violations. 23 The
United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations drafted the UN Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations in 1990;24 in 1995, President Clinton announced
a set of “model business principles,” a voluntary code of ethics to be used by US-based
multinational companies. These model codes encourage TNCs to respect fundamental
human and labor rights, though without sufficient detail as to give clear guidance. 25
Furthermore, “the self- interest of a corporation and the need to enhance shareholder value
takes precedence over concern for the community as a whole.”26 TNCs routinely deny
responsibility for the knock-on effects of their operations 27 because profit is the goal of
corporations, and because human rights and environmental protections can be safely
ignored as they are not legally mandated concerns. We therefore cannot rely on TNCs to
self- impose codes that respect environmental protection and human rights.
C. An Example: Oil Transnational Corporations in Nigeria

¶15

The TNCs in the oil industry in Nigeria provide a clear and well documented
example of severe environmental destruction by oil TNCs and the affects of that
environmental destruction on the local population. 28 This example also illustrates the
need to establish a legal avenue through which TNCs can be held accountable for their
negative effect on the environment.
¶16
Despite the environmental destruction and concomitant human rights violations in
this example, the actionable legal claims of the Niger Delta population were based mainly
on human rights violations such as the extrajudicial killings and the military action of the
23

See, e.g., U.N. Global Compact, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last updated Nov. 1,
2005); ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,
adopted by the ILO Governing Body in 1977, para. 8, ILO Document OB Vol.LXI, 1978, Series A, No.1.
(asks parties to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); Andy Smith, The CERES Principles:
A Voluntary Code for Corporate Environmental Responsibility, 18 YALE J. INTL. L. 307, 309 n.18 (1993);
Cassel, supra note 19; Meaghan Shaughnessy, The United Nations Global Compact and the continuing
Debate About the Effectiveness of Corporate Voluntary Codes of Conduct, 2000 COLO. J. INT ’L ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 159, 160 (2000).
24
Negotiations on the code ground to a halt in 1992, opposed by the corporations themselves and by
governments from the developed world, due to concerns at lack of protection for intellectual property
rights, profit repatriation and expropriation of property. See Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 M INN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 153, 153-58 (1997).
25
Robert S. Greenberger, Administration’s New Business Code Timed to Renewal of China Trade
Status, W ALL ST . J., May 30, 1995, at A3.
26
Shaughnessy, supra note 23, at 163-64.
27
“It is totally unjustified to suggest that Shell, by virtue of endeavoring to carry out its legitimate
business of oil exploration is in some way responsible for [the Ogoni] conflict or the level of the Nigerian
government’s response to [the conflict] . . . . [P]rivate companies have neither the right nor the competence
to become involved.” John Vidal, Born of Oil, Buried in Oil, GUARDIAN, Jan. 4, 1995, at T2 (quoting
Shell’s statement made in response to the brutal suppression by the Nigerian Government of a rebellion by
a local tribe in one of the most heavily polluted oil operation areas of the Niger Delta).
28
The Nigerian oil industry is known more for human rights violations such as torture, unfair trials,
execution of persons under 18, and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions than for the
environmental issues this article discusses. See generally Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d
88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. v. Wiwa, 532 U.S. 941 (2001); U.N. Econ. &
Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in Nigeria, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/62 (Feb. 16, 1998) (prepared by Soli Jehangir Sorabjee, Special Rapporteur).
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Nigerian government. 29 The environmental destruction caused by the oil TNCs and its
effects on human health were not addressed, and plaintiffs had no alternative legal
recourse through which to pursue such a claim. It is therefore necessary to extend the
reach of national, regional, and international law in order to protect the environment and
thereby the human communities that depend on it.
1. Background
¶17

Nigeria, located in Western Africa, is oil-rich and oil-reliant. It is the fifth largest
oil producer in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) and the
largest in Africa. 30 After decades of political instability, the country depends strongly on
its oil industry: the oil sector accounts for 20% of the GDP, 95% of foreign exchange
earnings, and about 65% of budgetary revenues. 31 Petroleum and petroleum products
make up 95% of export commodities. 32 Exported oil has been the Nigerian
Government’s main source of revenue since 1974. 33 The agricultural sector on the other
hand has declined reciprocally, and Nigeria, once a large exporter of food, now imports
food to feed its rapidly growing population. 34
¶18
The Nigerian oil industry is dominated by six joint-venture operations managed by
TNCs: Shell (Netherlands/U.K.), Mobil (US), Chevron-Texaco (US), AGIP (Italy), and
Elf-Aquitaine (France). 35 Under the Nigerian Constitution, all oil is property of its
federal government. 36 Therefore, the above TNCs are in partnership with the Nigerian
Government’s Nigerian National Petroleum Company (“NNPC”). 37 The Petroleum Act 38
sets the structure for oil operations in Nigeria. 39
29

See Wiwa, supra note 28, at 92 (mentioning substantial human rights violations through
environmental destruction as an allegation without ruling on the issue).
30
Steve Bamidele Owaduge, The Politics of Oil Production Among the Federal Government, Oil
Producing Companies and Oil Producing Communities of the Niger Delta Area of Nigeria,
http://www.greatestcities.com/users/owadge (Aug. 9, 2003, 10:21am). The World Fact Book estimates
2.356 million bbl/day (2004 est.). CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A GENCY, THE W ORLD FACT BOOK, 2005:
NIGERIA, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html (last modified Nov. 1,
2005).
31
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A GENCY, supra note 30.
32
Id.
33
ESSENTIAL A CTION AND GLOBAL EXCHANGE , OIL FOR NOTHING: M ULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION, DEATH AND IMPUNITY IN THE NIGER DELTA 4 (2000), available at
http://www.essentialaction.org/shell/Final_Report.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2005) [hereinafter ESSENTIAL
A CTION AND GLOBAL EXCHANGE ].
34
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A GENCY, supra note 30.
35
Nigerian Oil & Gas, http://www.nigerianoil-gas.com/upstream/index.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
36
CONSTITUTION, ch. IV (Fundamental Rights), pt. 44, § 3 (1999) (Nigeria) (“Notwithstanding the
foregoing provisions of this section, the entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and
natural gas in under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive
Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such
manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.”).
37
Nigerian Oil & Gas, supra note 35 (formed in 1977, NNPC regulates and supervises the Nigerian oil
industry on behalf of the government).
38
Petroleum Decree No. 51 (1969) (Nigeria).
39
Other relevant legislation includes the Oil in Navigable Waters Act Decree No. 34 (1968) (Nigeria),
the Oil Pipelines Act Decree No. 31 (1956) (Nigeria), the Associated Gas Act (1979) (Nigeria), and the
Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations (1969) (Nigeria). From 1988, the Federal Environmental
Protection Agency Act Decree No. 58 (1988) (Nigeria) vested the authority to issue standards for water, air,
and land quality in a Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), and regulations made by FEPA
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2. Environmental Degradation
¶19

The Nigerian oil industry is criticized for its poor environmental practices and the
resulting environmental destruction. Hazardous practices in the Niger Delta include gas
flaring and oil spills. Gas flaring is the practice of burning natural gas, a byproduct of oil
extraction. 40 The oil TNCs in Nigeria flare gas because it is cheaper to dispose of the gas
by burning it than it is to collect it for use or to re- inject it into the subsoil. 41 These flares
burn twenty- four hours a day and some have burned continuously for the past forty
years. 42 A report funded by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources (“IUCN”) 43 and produced by Environmental Rights Action on the
Niger Delta states that Nigeria flares 75% of its gas, which far exceeds any other
country’s allowable flaring limits. 44 In the year 2000, 95% of extracted natural gas was
flared in Ogoniland, a section of the Niger Delta, 45 compared to the 0.4% flared in the
entire US. 46
¶20
Another major environmental hazard in the Niger Delta is oil spills which
contaminate water and destroy plants and animals. Major spills are recorded on average
three times a month; 47 between 1976 and 1996, 4,835 oil spills were recorded. 48 Crude oil
and refined petroleum product pipelines run for 7,264 kilometers through Nigeria 49 and
often run in front of homes and over precious farmland. 50 The pipes are rusty and in need
of repair; some are reportedly forty years old. 51 Oil leaks from poorly maintained
pipelines and “blow-outs” of poorly maintained wells add to the crude oil pollution. 52

under the decree govern environmental standards in the oil and other industries. The Department of
Petroleum Resources (DPR) has also issued a set of Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the
Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (1991), which overlap with, and in some cases, differ from those issued by
FEPA.
40
See Environment Canada, Oil & Gas, Flaring, General Info.,
http://www.ec.gc.ca/energ/oilgas/flaring/flaring_general_e.htm (last updated Dec. 19, 2001) (Natural gas is
a valuable non-renewable resource and flaring it is pure waste. Alternatives include: collecting and
processing for use, re-injecting in the subsoil to maintain reservoir pressure during production, and
powering micro-turbine generators for electricity production. Even if these alternatives prove too costly,
incineration exists as a possibility. Incineration combusts gas more efficiently than flaring and therefore
results in fewer toxic byproducts.).
41
Essential Action and Global Exchange, supra note 33, at sec. 1.
42
Id.
43
See COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF IUCN, D RAFT INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT xi (2d ed. 2000).
44
NICK A SHTON-JONES, SUSI A RNOTT & ORONTO DOUGLAS, THE HUMAN ECOSYSTEMS OF THE NIGER
DELTA 158 (1998).
45
ESSENTIAL A CTION AND GLOBAL EXCHANGE , supra note 33, at sec. 1.
46
US Nonproliferation Policy After Iraq: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations., 108th
Cong. 104-31 (2003) (statement of John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security, US Dept. of State); accompanying graphs and maps available at
http://www.state.gov/t/us/21782.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
47
Id.
48
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES M ANAGERS LT D., NIGER DELTA ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY FINAL
REPORT , PHASE I 249 (See http://www.erml.net for information about the reporting company).
49
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A GENCY, supra note 30.
50
ESSENTIAL A CTION AND GLOBAL EXCHANGE , supra note 33, at sec. 1.
51
Id.
52
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, A FRICA, NIGERIA : THE OGONI CRISIS: A CASE -STUDY OF MILITARY
REPRESSION IN SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA 8 (1995).
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The incidence of oil spills in the Niger Delta is exceptionally high; 40% of all of
Shell’s oil spills between 1982 and 1992 occurred in the Niger Delta despite the fact that
Shell drilled for oil in twenty-eight different countries during the same period. 53 A World
Bank investigation found that hydrocarbon pollution54 in Ogoniland water was over sixty
times US limits. 55 Project Underground found the hydrocarbon pollution in one water
source to be 360 times the limit of the European Community. 56
3. The Impact of Environmental Degradation on Humans

¶22

The impact of oil pollution on the Niger Delta environment and its inhabitants is
severe. Oil pollution from gas flaring, oil spills, hydrocarbon crust left after oil spill
“cleanups” as well as acid rain, unlined waste pits, and waste from expatriate employee
communities and hospitals contributes to the destruction of the ecosystem.
¶23
Natural gas flaring negatively impacts the environment and the local inhabitants.
The flares are very loud, dangerously hot, and flare twenty-four hours a day, thereby
depriving the surrounding area of natural night, emit thick smoke and greenhouse gases,
and smell noxious. 57 Inhabitants of the Niger Delta suffer from respiratory diseases
caused by the smoke and fumes as well as hearing loss caused by the continuous noise. 58
Gas flaring also contributes to acid rain59 which poisons potable water, stunts crop
growth, damages the ecosystem, and increases the rate of housing deterioration. 60
¶24
Oil pollution of water has extensive implications. Most of Nigeria’s oil reserves
are located in the coastal region of the Niger Delta 61 which, at over 20,000 square
kilometers, is the largest wetland in Africa and one of the largest in the world. 62 Even if
the oil does not directly spill into water sources, rain washes the pollution into the
water. 63 Oil in the water coats the breathing roots of mangroves and kills the trees, an
essential element of the wetland ecosystem. 64 Mangroves are, in essence, the frame upon
53

Steven Cayford, The Ogoni Uprising: Oil, Human Rights and a Democratic Alternative in Nigeria, 43
A FRICA TODAY 2, Apr./June 1996, at 183.
54
See generally Global Marine Oil Pollution Information Gateway, http://oils.gpa.unep.org (last
updated Jan. 6, 2005). Hydrocarbons usually make up 95 per cent of crude oil. Id. Hydrocarbons vary in
toxicity and degradability, and range from very volatile, light materials like propane and benzene, to heavy
compounds such as bitumens, asphaltenes, resins and waxes. Id.
55
PROJECT UNDERGROUND, THE FLAMES OF SHELL: A FACT SHEET (Berkeley ed. 1996).
56
PROJECT UNDERGROUND AND RAINFOREST A CTION NETWORK , HUMAN RIGHTS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATIONS INFORMATION ON THE ROYAL DUTCH / SHELL GROUP OF COMPANIES: 19961997, Independent Annual Report (1997).
57
ESSENTIAL A CTION AND GLOBAL EXCHANGE , supra note 33, at sec. 1.
58
A NDREW ROWELL, GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL , SHELL-SHOCKED: THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND
SOCIAL COSTS OF LIVING WITH SHELL IN NIGERIA (1994),
http://archive.greenpeace.org/comms/ken/hell.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2005) (discussing the events and
environmental destruction of Ogoniland).
59
OLALDELE OSIBANJO, INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION M ANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA, IN ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSCIOUSNESS FOR NIGERIAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 95, 97 (E.O.A. Aina & N.O. Adedipe eds., 1992)
(a publication of Nigeria’s Federal Environmental Protection Agency).
60
ESSENTIAL A CTION AND GLOBAL EXCHANGE , supra note 33, at sec. 1.
61
Owaduge, supra note 30.
62
M. David & L. Olof, Perception and Reality: Assessing Priorities For Sustainable Development in
the Niger River Delta, 24 A MBIO (A J. OF THE HUMAN ENV’T ) 7-8 (1995).
63
Paul Adams, Local Politics Drains Nigeria’s Oil, FIN. TIMES, June 7, 1994, at 4.
64
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR MANGROVE ECOSYSTEMS & COSTAL M ARINE PROJECT OF UNESCO,
M ANGROVE ECOSYSTEMS TECHNICAL REPORTS, CONSERVATION & SUSTAINABLE UTILIZATION OF

193

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2005

which the wetlands exist. When the mangroves die, the roots no longer hold the delta silt
in place and erosion results. Erosion in turn leads to the destruction of habitats, diversion
of waterways, and decreased biodiversity. The pollution makes the water non-potable
and, because there is no piped water, 65 the only options are to import potable water at
great cost or to consume the polluted water. 66 The oil film in the water also prevents
natural aeration, killing the organisms below the film and reducing the fish population. 67
Fish that ingest the oil become poisonous to humans. 68 The inhabitants of the Niger Delta
have shown higher rates of respiratory ailments, skin rashes, tumors, gastrointestinal
problems, cancers, and malnourishment. 69 Kwashiorkor, malnourishment due to protein
deficiency, is especially prevalent and is due to the lower fish catch and decreased crop
productivity that has resulted from the pollution. 70
¶25
The inhabitants of the Niger Delta once subsisted on fish from the delta waters and
produce from the arable land. 71 Now, however, after more than thirty-eight years of oil
operations, pollution covers the region; the population in the Niger Delta suffers land loss
and food shortage. Their subsistence lifestyle cannot be sustained because of the
environmental damage caused by oil pollution; nor do they have the means to buy food
because there are no economic alternatives to their traditional lifestyle. As a result,
hunger and malnutrition are rampant, and the Niger Delta population suffers increased
mortality and morbidity. Moreover, there is no effective legal recourse in international or
domestic courts to redress such grievances.
III. EXISTING LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR PROMOTING ENVIRONMENTAL P ROTECTION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
¶26

This section reviews current relevant Nigerian, international, and US legal
instruments that may protect the environment and promote human rights while increasing
TNC liability.
A. Domestic Law: Why It Fails

¶27

Environmental regulation by the host country is currently the preferred means of
preventing abuses like those in Nigeria because it respects the universal concept of state
sovereignty. Between fifty and sixty national constitutions incorporate environmental
human rights; almost every constitution revised or adopted since 1970 includes the right
to a healthy environment. 72
M ANGROVE FORESTS IN LATIN A MERICA AND A FRICA REGIONS, Part III, Africa, (E.S. Diop ed. 1993).
65
Vidal, supra note 27.
66
NIGERIAN ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY/A CTION TEAM , THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
IN NIGERIA 170 (Tade Akin Aina & Ademola T. Salau eds. 1992).
67
NIGERIAN ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY/A CTION TEAM , NIGERIA’S THREATENED ENVIRONMENT : A
NATIONAL PROFILE 87-88 (1991).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, supra note 52.
72
See Prudence E. Taylor, From Environmental to Ecological Human Right: A New Dynamic in
International Law?, 10 GEO. INT ’L ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 350 (1990); A LEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 27 (2d ed. 2000).
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¶28

While application and enforcement of environmental regulations by the host
country is in the best interest of the citizens subsisting on the land, it is not always
feasible. The Nigerian government has designed what on its face is a very
comprehensive system of environmental regulation and protection. 73 However, while
many countries have successfully regulated impact to their environment, 74 Nigeria’s
environmental policies are “[r]arely enforced, [and] the regulations are usually simply
ignored.”75 The Nigerian government, which has relied on the oil TNCs as its main
source of revenue since 1974 76 and which typically holds a 60% share of the joint venture
interest with the transnational oil companies, 77 likely fears that the enforcement of
environmental regulations curbing the activities of the oil industry would reduce
government revenue and may cause oil TNCs to flee Nigeria if the TNCs foresee profit
decline. 78 If this is the case, the Nigerian government is patently reluctant to regulate the
oil industry for fear of the impact on profitability. Moreover, “[s]ince Nigeria’s
independence in 1960, Nigeria has seen several military coups, a number of caretaker
governments and civilian governments.”79 This governmental instability often prevents
comprehensive laws being enacted, and if enacted, hinders enforcement.
¶29
The reality is that TNCs have enormous economic and thereby political clout and
often the government and the courts of a developing country may hesitate to impose
liability on a profitable industry. Thus, additional legal mechanisms to support domestic
law should be developed.
B. International Human Rights: A Framework for Environmental Claims
¶30

The body of international human rights law does not effectively protect against
human rights violations which result from environmental degradation because it has not
evolved to keep pace with the rapid advance of economic globalization and the
privatization of resources. As a result, human rights violations stemming from
environmental destruction by TNCs are not addressed in current international human
rights law.
1. International Human Rights Law

¶31

Modern international human rights law was born from the UN Charter80 and the
Nuremberg trials 81 and its edifice is structured on the scaffolding of the Universal

73

See Eaton, supra note 3, 282-92 (overview of Nigerian environmental regulation).
ROWELL , supra note 58, (discussing successful regulation of Shell in Scotland).
75
A UGUSTINE A. IKEIN , THE IMPACT OF OIL ON A DEVELOPING COUNTRY: THE CASE OF NIGERIA 42
(1990) (“There is no doubt that Nigeria has guidelines for oil exploration but fails to maintain effective
enforcement and compliance.”).
76
Essential Action and Global Exchange, supra note 33, at intro. The oil sector provides Nigeria with
20% of its GDP, 95% of its foreign exchange earnings, and about 65% of its budgetary revenues. The
Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 30. Petroleum and petroleum products make up 95% of export
commodities. Id.
77
Centre for Petroleum Information, http://www.petroinfonigeria.com/faq.html (last updated Jan. 2004).
78
Eaton, supra note 3, at 291.
79
Sorabjee, supra note 28.
80
See Cassel, supra note 19.
81
Id.
74
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Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) which itself is not legally binding. 82 Human
rights were transferred during this period from the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign
states to the international arena. 83 The responsibility to abstain from and prevent
violations of human rights became an obligation of nation states. 84 This shift in
responsibility positively affected the international human rights movement by bringing
human rights atrocities to international attention. However, the focus on war crimes of
World War II limited the scope of the body of law. 85 For example, the international
obligation does not extend to human rights violations committed by anyone but states or
state actors. Nonetheless, a state can be held accountable “for violations by private actors
if it fails to exercise due diligence to prevent the violations or to respond to them. But, if
a government does not seriously investigate human rights violations committed by
private parties, those parties are aided in a sense by the government, thereby making the
State responsible on the international plane.”86 Unfortunately, governments of
developing countries are often reluctant to restrain the activities of TNCs for fear of
economic losses and TNCs are not directly accountable for human rights violations under
international law.
¶32
Two covenants to which Nigeria is a party, inter alia, further define the body of
international human rights law: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) 87 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”). 88 The ICCPR guarantees the protectio n of civil rights; the ICESCR
guarantees the right to health, an adequate standard of living – including food and
housing. These embody the principles of the UDHR, rendering them as legally binding
rights. 89 However, in May 1998, the UN Committee on Econo mic, Social and Cultural
Rights “note[d] with alarm the extent of the devastation that oil exploration has done to
the environment and quality of life in areas such as Ogoniland where oil has been
discovered and extracted without due regard to the health and well-being of the people
and their environment,” and recommended that “[t]he rights of minority and ethnic
communities—including the Ogoni people—should be respected and full redress should
be provided for the violations of the rights set forth in the Covenant that they have
suffered.”90 Nigerians, especially in the Niger Delta, lack the basic elements of existence

82

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). Although not legally binding at the time it was adopted, many argue that
“subsequent state practice has transformed it into a document considered by many to be a statement of
customary international law.” Taylor, supra note 72, at 315 n.18.
83
Id.
84
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 82.
85
See Cassel, supra note 19.
86
Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28 STAN . J.
INT ’L L. 103, 123 (1991) (quoting Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) at 156).
87
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 6(1), U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966
[hereinafter ICCPR].
88
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 UNT.S. 3, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966
[hereinafter ICESCR].
89
Taylor, supra note 72, at 315.
90
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Nigeria, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.23 (June 16, 1998).
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provided by the ICCPR and the ICESCR, such that the state is in direct contravention of
these covenants to which it is a party.
2. International Environmental Law
¶33

Current international environmental law and international human rights law
developed without regard for each other and are not sufficient in this global economy.
Moreover, international environmental law generally focuses on trans-border
environmental harm and does not regulate domestic environmental issues. 91 Citizens
must rely on national law for redress and protection, which is often not an effective
avenue. 92 Additionally, international human rights law is neither linked to a healthy
environment nor to international environmental law and TNCs are not held accountable
for human rights violations that stem from their direct environmental destruction.
¶34
Two general approaches to environmental protection exist: the anthropocentric
approach and the ecocentric approach. Most international environmental discourse uses
the anthropocentric approach93 such that human life and health is the goal of
environmental protection and “the environment is only protected as a consequence of,
and to the extent needed to protect human well-being.”94 The anthropocentric approach
protects the environment through the advancement of human rights and can occur either
by linking environmental harm to a fundamental human right or by expanding the
substantive human rights to include the right to a healthy environment. 95 Some critics,
however, view the anthropocentric approach as “the root of all environmental problems”
because it detracts from a more extensive ecological view of environmental rights and
prefer the ecocentric approach. 96 The ecocentric view requires that environmental law
develop in order to protect the environment beyond human needs. This means that not
only is the environment protected by the advancement of human rights, the environment
is protected for its own sake.
¶35
Both the anthropocentric and ecocentric approaches to environmental law would be
germane to the development of the field of environmental human rights; minimal
environmental standards could come to be regarded legally as a basic human right
thereby linking the environment to substantive human rights. 97 Framing conventions and
treaties in both an anthropocentric and ecocentric manner while holding TNCs directly
accountable for violations of these laws would be ideal. Such laws would have to be
enforceable and provide for meaningful redress and penalties, and would therefore have

91

U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 [hereinafter Stockholm
Declaration].
92
See, e.g., Dommen, supra note 12, at 3 (the three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River was approved by
the Chinese national popular congress but building of the dam violates international environmental and
human rights norms).
93
See Taylor, supra note 72, at 329.
94
Id., at 352. See also Kerry Kennedy Cuomo, Human Rights and the Environment: Common Ground,
18 YALE J. INT ’L. L. 227 (1993).
95
See James Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives on its Scope
and Justification, 18 YALE J. INT ’L. L. 281, 290, 292 (1993); see also Taylor, supra note 72.
96
Taylor, supra note 72, at 337.
97
Michelle Leighton Schwartz, International Legal Protection fro Victims of Environmental Abuse, 18
YALE J. INT ’L L. 355, 359 (1992).
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to be enacted and enforced at the international level so that corrupt or impoverished states
could not ignore their own citizenry.
3. Environmental Human Rights
¶36

The anthropocentric approach to environmental protection has lead to the
development of an area of soft- law known as environmental human rights that combines
international human rights and environmental protection which is developing and gaining
recognition in the international community. “Environmental human rights use global
human rights norms to state a universal standard of minimum environmental protection.
This leverages human rights standards to globalize our understanding of unacceptable
environmental harm.”98
¶37
While there is no explicit universally accepted right to a healthy environment,
international instruments link human rights and environmental protection. A discussion
of seven landmark instruments follows: The Stockholm Declaration99 is the first
international instrument to explicitly recognize the link between the environment and
human rights. 100 While the Stockholm Declaration grants nations the “sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies,”101 it also gives
one the “fundamental right to freedom, equality, and adequate conditions of life, in an
environment of quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears solemn
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future
generations.”102 This points up the conflict between state sovereignty and environmental
protection as found in Nigeria, and illustrates the need to balance the two.
¶38
Second, the Declaration of the Right to Development includes equality of access to
basic resources and food. 103 Third, the Rio Declaration’s Principle 4 states that
environmental protection cannot be considered in isolation from the development
process. 104 Fourth, the Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes
“distinctive and profound relationship with their lands” and includes “the prevention and
redress for . . . dispossession of their lands, territories, or resources.”105 Fifth, the Hague
Declaration recognizes “the right to live in dignity in a viable global environment.”106
Sixth, the Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment further
98

Ziemer, supra note 4, at 235.
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 91.
100
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Report of the UN
Conference on the Human Environment, 2-7, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1 (1973). See Louis B. Sohn,
The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INT ’L L.J. 423, 431-32 (1973).
101
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 91, at prin. 21.
102
Id., at prin. 1.
103
Declaration of the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 186,
U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (Dec. 4, 1986).
104
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, at prin. 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (non-binding but recommends states develop laws
of liability and compensation for environmental damage).
105
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (Apr. 20, 1994).
106
Hague Declaration on the Environment, Mar. 11, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1308, reprinted in Selected
International Legal Materials for Global Warming, 5 A M. U.J. INT ’L L. & POL’Y 513, 567 (1990).
99
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develops environmental human rights. 107 And finally, Article 24 of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child expressly links environmental quality to the right to health. 108
None of these documents create a distinct right to a healthy environment. 109
¶39
In addition to these international conventions, the African Charter of Human and
Peoples Rights, to which Nigeria is a party, recognizes an environmental human right.
The Charter declares that “[a]ll people have a right to a safe and satisfactory environment
favorable to their development.”110 Articles 21, 22 and 24 provide the right to an
environment generally favorable to one’s development, the right to economic, social and
cultural development, and the right to the benefits derived from natural resources. 111
¶40
Some scholars and legal experts find “universal acceptance of environmental rights
at the national, regional, and international levels.”112 However, most of these instruments
that address environmental protection and economic development are criticized as being
“non-binding, soft- law agreements, many of which are worded so broadly that they
provide little or no guidance to states or TNCs.”113 The current international instrume nts
do not sufficiently combine environmental protection and human rights or establish an
environmental human right, nor do they provide effective legal enforcement mechanisms.
¶41
The two main goals of environmental human rights are: 1) to prevent
environmental harm; and 2) to provide recovery from environmental harm. States
typically affected by environmental degradation by TNCs are often too economically
107

See Adriana Fabra Aguilar & Neil A.F. Popovic, Lawmaking in the United Nations: The UN Study
on Human Rights and the Environment, 3 REV. EUR. COM. & INT ’L ENVTL. L. 197 (1994).
108
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 61st plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989).
109
Sumudu Atapattu, The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted?: The Emergence of a
Human Right to a Healthy Environment Under International Law, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 65, 85 n.113
(2002).
110
Africa Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 24 (1981), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 557 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1992).
111
Sorabjee, supra note 28. Other regional instruments that link a healthy environment to human rights
exist. See Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 14, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 156, 165.
112
U.N. ECOSOC, Comm. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of
Minorities, Review of Further Developments in Fields with which the Sub-Commission Has Been
Concerned, Human Rights and the Environment: Final Report, ¶ 240, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9
(July 6, 1994) (prepared by Fatma Zohra Ksentini, Special Rapporteur).
113
“Soft-law” instruments are not legally enforceable while “hard-law” instruments –treaties or
conventions – are legally enforceable. Eaton, supra note 3, 272 n.62. If soft-law becomes opinion juris
(generally accepted by States) and adopted in practice, it can become a norm of customary international law
that is binding and legally enforceable. Id., at 272-78. See U.N. ECOSOC, UN Draft Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/1988/39/Add.1 (1988) (“TNCs shall carry out their activities in
accordance with national laws, regulations, established administrative practices and policies relating to the
preservation of the environment of the countries in which they operate and with due regard to relevant
international standards. TNCs should, in performing their activities, take steps to protect the environment
and where damaged to rehabilitate it and should make efforts to develop and apply adequate technologies
for this purpose.”); Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: Annex
on Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 15 I.L.M. 969 (June 21, 1976) (“[R]ecommendations jointly
addressed by Member countries to multinational enterprises operating in their territories. . . [which are]
voluntary and not legally enforceable.”); UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Report of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, at art. 21,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992) (Encouraging TNCs to “recognize environmental management
as among the highest corporate priorities” and “[t]o adopt and report on the implementation of codes of
conduct promoting the best environmental practice.”).
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disadvantaged or corrupt to achieve these goals alone. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the internationa l community to work together and apply novel methods to achieve these
goals. One solution is to impose an international scheme of corporate accountability.
This scheme would help reduce the number of environmental disasters through
deterrence as well as help shoulder the cost of cleanup and reparations. As stated above,
this would require recognition of coherent, universally recognized principles 114 such that
international law, which currently does not afford the right to a healthy environment,
would be able to encompass environmental protection as a substantive human right.
¶42
Although TNCs will likely use their political clout to prevent the application of
more stringent international laws,
it is noteworthy that human rights law not only potentially imposes duties
on non-state economic actors, it guarantees rights essential for the
furtherance of globalization. It protects the right to property, including
intellectual property, freedom of expression and communications across
boundaries, due process for contractual or other business disputes, and a
remedy before an independent tribunal when rights are violated.
Furthermore, the rule of law is an essential prerequisite to the long-term
conduct of trade and investment. 115
Perhaps such guarantees, combined with consumer boycotts and the like, will encourage
TNCs to accept the proposed right to a healthy environment.
4. Environmental Rights within Substantive Human Rights
¶43

International human rights law has been used for environmental issues even though
the International Bill of Human Rights does not address environmental protection directly
or an explicit right to a healthy environment. Because environmental injustices cannot be
addressed directly in international human rights law, fundamental human rights such as
the right to life, the right to health, and the right to an adequate standard of living can be
used instead; 116 increasingly, redress for environmental destruction is being sought
through substantive human rights. 117 This use of substantive human rights as a means to
reformulate “our understanding of unacceptable environmental harm” links human
security inextricably to the state of the environment. 118 To illustrate the use of
substantive human rights to establish environmental rights, this section addresses the
options available for redress to the populations of the Niger Delta within the current
international human rights framework.

114

See Klaus Bosselmann, Human Rights and the Environment: Redefining Fundamental Principles?,
in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE SOURCE , ch. 16
(2002), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/environment/iel/sixteen.cfm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
115
Shelton, supra note 8, at 285-86.
116
S. DOUGLAS-SCOTT , ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY OR DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
111-12 (A. Boyle & M. Anderson eds., 1996).
117
Schwartz, supra note 97, at 359.
118
Ziemer, supra note 4, at 235.
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First, the human right to life is protected in the UDHR119 and the ICCPR. 120
Humans need “air to breathe, water to drink, food to eat, and a habitable climate,”
elements of a healthy environment, to enjoy rights guaranteed under international human
rights law. 121 Man- made environmental destruction highlights the intersection between
the right to life and a healthy environment; “more than two million deaths annually can
be attributed to pollution.”122 Claims that environmental destruction infringes on the right
to life have surfaced in courts around the world. A case illustrating a successful regional
example in which a court found a right to a clean environment is that of the Yanomami
Indians of Brazil in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 123 However, in
contrast, the European Court of Human Rights did not find a right to a clean
environment. 124 In one international example on record, the ICCPR-established UN
Human Rights Committee, in a case regarding a radioactive waste dump of the Canadian
Government, noted that the protection of human life was of interest. 125 The population of
the Niger Delta could likewise formulate a claim that the environmental destruction
caused by the oil industry violated their right to life because of the increased mortality
rates in the region, resulting directly from pollution aggravated illnesses and malnutrition.
¶45
Second, the right to health could also be the basis for an environmental claim. This
right is protected in the UDHR126 and the ICESCR. 127 This claim may meet greater
success than the right to life claim because, as mentioned above, a link between the
environment and human health is internationally recognized. The UN General Assembly
states that “all individuals are entitled to live in an environment adequate for their health
and well-being.”128 The Niger Delta population could claim that the increased incidence
of respiratory problems, cancer, and other health problems due to the oil pollution
infringes on their right to health.
¶46
Third, the Niger Delta communities could use the right to be free from hunger as
protected under the UDHR129 and the ICESCR. 130 Pollutants from the oil operations in
Nigeria lead directly to the contamination of food resources and to declining fish and
agricultural harvests. In turn, this leads to increased rates of malnourishment and
starvation.
¶44

119

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 82, art. 3.
ICCPR, supra note 87, at art. 6(1).
121
Atapattu, supra note 109, at 99.
122
Ksentini, supra note 112, at 42.
123
Yanomami Case, Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 12/85, OEA/ser. L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1
(1985), reprinted in 1985 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. 264, 279.
124
See Richard Desgagne, Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human
Rights, 89 A M. J. INT ’L L. 263, 265-73 (1995) (environmental destruction may violate Article 8, the right to
private life and home, which guarantees a quality of life and physical well-being).
125
ICCPR, supra note 87 (allows individuals to petition the UN Human Rights Committee once they
have exhausted local remedies). This case was dismissed because the plaintiffs did not exhaust local
remedies. Eaton, supra note 3, at 299.
126
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 82, at art. 23(1), 25(1).
127
ICESCR, supra note 88, at art. 7(b), 12(b).
128
G.A. Res. 45/94, at 2, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/94 (1990).
129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 82, at art. 25(1).
130
ICESCR, supra note 88, at art. 11.
120
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¶47

In addition, the Niger Delta population could make claims through other rights such
as: 1) the infringement of cultural human rights protected under the UDHR131 and the
ICESCR132 based on the destruction of their subsistence lifestyle; 2) the infringement of
the right to self-determination protected by the ICCPR which gives man the right to
“freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources”; 133 and 3) the infringement of the
right to an adequate standard of living/quality of life on the basis that environmental
destruction affects quality of life. 134
¶48
Using human rights machinery to address environmental harm is problematic
however because such action will fail if the plaintiffs cannot “prove that the
environmental issue in question has violated one of [their] human rights.”135 Moreover,
cataclysmic environmental destruction must occur before the claimants can argue on the
basis of the right to life. 136 Thus, in order to avoid severe environmental destruction and
concomitant injury to human communities, international law must expand accountability
to hold TNCs directly liable for environmental degradation. As previously noted
however, such development presents difficulties because of the economic interests of
states and TNCs.
C. The United States: The Responsibility of Nation States as Global Economic Leaders
¶49

As described above, the international mindset is making a slow progression
towards protection of the environment through international human rights law and
towards implementing the idea of corporate accountability on an international basis.
However, the time required for such ideas to become hard-law will be long, and the
interim will likely see a significant amount of environmental destruction with its
accompanying negative impacts on human populations. In an era of increased global
responsibility, wealthy developed countries, from which 90 % of TNCs originate, 137 have
the ability to assist developing countries. Wealthy countries, such as the US, are
typically in a better position to regulate parent corporations and to impose liability
through their court systems. However, most developed countries shun this responsibility.
Nonetheless, it is incumbent on the developed economies like the US to provide shortterm solutions. This would give the international community the time to engender a
long-term solution on the “right to a safe environment.”138
¶50
Between 1988 and 1993, global inequality increased 5% and almost 80% of the
world population during this period was living below the poverty standards that are the

131

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 82, art. 27(1).
ICESCR, supra note 88, at art. 15(1)(a).
133
ICCPR, supra note 87, at art. 1.
134
S. v. France, App. No. 13728/1988, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (May 17, 1990) (finding that “noise of
a considerable magnitude could not only affect the physical well-being of individuals, but also prevent
them from enjoying the amenities of their home”). Despite the vast wealth produced from the oil found
under the delta, the Niger Delta region remains poorer than the national average, which offers support to
the above arguments. Owaduge, supra note 30.
135
Atapattu, supra note 109, at 98, (citing Douglas-Scott, supra note 127, at 111-12).
136
Id., at 100-101.
137
Robert J. Fowler, International Environmental Standards for Transnational Corporations, 25
ENVTL. L. at 2 (1995).
138
See Nickel, supra note 95.
132
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recognized norms in the US and Western Europe. 139 In its Development Report, the
World Bank “estimates that, at purchasing power parity, the per capita GDP in the richest
twenty countries in 1960 was eighteen times that of the poorest twenty countries.”140
This gap expanded to thirty-seven times by 1995. 141 Furthermore, the “ratio of real
income per head in the richest countries to that of the poorest was 10:1 in 1900 and 60:1
by the year 2000.”142 Arguably, to expect the developed world to take measures to
protect the environment in the less developed nations does not place an unfair burden on
wealthy nations. Furthermore, wealthy nations typically contribute more to
environmental degradation than poorer countries do and also control more resources than
developing nations. For example, Australia is “the world’s highest per capita producer of
greenhouse gases,” and the US, with only 5% of the world population, produces 40% of
global greenhouse gases. 143
¶51
While international law navigates the confusion of its own evolution, nations with
global influence like the US should ratify relevant treaties and enforce the laws in their
own jurisdictions and control in order to expand liability and compensation within
international law for the victims of environmental damage. 144 The US, in particular,
could put its weight behind the environmental human rights movement because it has a
surplus of resources and technology that it can commit to environmental protection,
unlike countries like Nigeria which tend to focus their limited resources to provide basic
services. 145 Although the US seems currently unwilling to accept a healthy environment
as a human right, this section presents ways the US can help protect environmental
human rights and increase the liability of TNCs. 146
1. Extraterritorial Prescription of US Environmental Laws
¶52

The first solution is the extraterritorial prescription of US environmental law. The
US has a comprehensive body of environmental laws including the Comprehensive
Environmental Response and Liability Act (CERCLA)147 and the Oil Pollution Act of
139

Branko Milanovic, True World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993: First Calculations Based on
Household Surveys Alone, ECON. J. (2002).
140
INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE , REDUCING THE DECENT WORK DEFICIT : A GLOBAL CHALLENGE REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL 49 (2001), (citing W ORLD BANK, W ORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2000/2001: A TTACKING POVERTY (2001)).
141
Id.
142
Vanesa Baird, Fear Eats the Soul, NEW INTERNATIONALIST M AG., (2002) (citing M ICHAEL
DUMMETT, ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES (Routledge, 2001)). See also The Worldwatch Institute, Vital
Signs 2003: The Trends that Are Shaping our Future, 163 SCI . NEWS 23, June 7, 2003, at issn: 0036-8423.
(while the global economy has increased seven fold, per capita income between the 20 richest and the 20
poorest nations more than doubled between 1980 and 1995).
143
Pamela Bone, Let’s Celebrate the Need to Breed, THE A GE, Aug. 9, 2003.
144
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 91, at prin. 22.
145
Eaton, supra note 3, at 274.
146
The US will not sign the Protocol of San Salvador which recognizes the right to a healthy
environment. Scott D. Calahan, Recent Development, NIMBY: Not in Mexico’s Back Yard?, A Case for
Recognition of a Human Right to Healthy Environment in the American States, 23 GA. J. INT ’L & COMP . L.
409, 430 (1993).
147
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1980), amended in 1986 by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). Congress created a system of strict liability for
environmental damage when it enacted CERCLA during the 1980’s. The purpose of CERCLA is to
promote the clean up of hazardous waste sites by allocating the costs among responsible parties. United
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1990.148 Were the US to impose domestic environmental law on foreign branches of US
based TNCs, 149 environmental damage like that in Nigeria could be avoided or at least
reduced. If TNCs based in the US entered a developing state such as Nigeria knowing
they had to abide by readily enforceable US environmental laws, they would conduct
business in a less destructive manner. Additionally, extraterritorial prescription of
environmental law on US based TNCs would help increase international environmental
concern and shift the focus of liability onto TNCs and their state of nationality. 150
Although US environmental laws do not directly protect humans, they work towards
protecting the health of the environment and, thus, indirectly protect humans. However,
the extraterritorial application of environmental law has many problems and is therefore
impractical.
¶53
For instance, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations states that, “a state has
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . (1)(c) conduct outside its territory that has
or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory, [and] (2) the activities,
interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory.”151
However, law may not be prescribed extraterritorially if the exercise of such jurisdiction
is unreasonable. 152 Unreasonableness can include that “another state may have an interest
in regulating the activity.”153 Both examples bring jurisdictional issues into play and
allow US courts an easy exit. Furthermore, a state may not prescribe its laws
extraterritorially if it is trying to regulate “predominantly local activities, such as
industrial and labor relations, health and safety practices, or conduct related to
preservation or control of the local environment.”154
¶54
Several other problems increase the impracticality of exterritorial prescription of
US environmental laws. First, such a practice infringes on a state’s sovereign right to
exploit its resources pursuant to its domestic laws. This is considered a rule of customary
international law155 and has been reaffirmed in the Stockholm Declaration156 and the Rio

States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55-56 (1998) (citing S. Rep. No. 96-848, at 13 (1980)). Liable parties
include those “which had any commercial relationship with the waste (generators, transporter, and
disposers) or the waste site (current owners and owner/operators at the time of waste disposal).” Sanford E.
Gaines, International Principles for Transnational Environmental Liability: Can Developments in
Municipal Law Help Break the Impasse?, 30 HARV. INT ’L L.J. 311, 331 (citing 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1-4)
(1980)). Once these parties are found liable, they are responsible for the costs to clean-up and restore the
site to acceptable environmental standards. 42 USC § 9670. CERCLA imposes liability both retroactively
and jointly and severally. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 146 (1987). CERCLA does
not cover oil spills; therefore, the US should apply the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702-2761 (1990).
148
§ 1002(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(A); 15 C.F.R. § 990.20(b).
149
Recommended by Agenda 21 of the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises, June 21, 1976, Annex on Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 15 I.L.M. 969.
150
See Gaines, supra note 147, at 317-18 (“[I]nternational law has accumulated a growing body of
treaties, conventions, and other indicia of ‘State practice’ with respect to ultrahazardous activities and
certain other narrowly defined problems. To this extent, the concept of transnational liability has already
gained international acceptance.”).
151
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1), (2) (1987).
152
Id.
153
Id., at § 403(2)(g).
154
Id., at § 414 cmt. c.
155
Peter H. Sand, UNCED and the Development of International Environmental Law, 3 Y.B. INT ’L
ENVTL L. 3, 8 (1992).
156
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 91, at prin. 21 (“States have . . . the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
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Declaration. 157 Second, regulation and enforcement would be logistically difficult and
expensive for the US because US based TNCs are spread across the globe. 158 Third, the
US will likely not want to impose stricter laws on US based TNCs than are imposed on
domestic corporations of the host country because of the adverse affect it may have on
the success of US-based TNCs.159 Fourth, extraterritorial prescription of laws creates a
lack of uniformity in a single country which would lead to competitive advantage for
TNCs based in countries with lower environmental standards. 160 Finally, TNCs can
choose to avoid extraterritorial prescription of US laws by incorporating outside of the
US. Thus, although exterritorial prescription of US environmental laws may seem like a
good idea at first glance, it is likely an ineffective method.
2. Entity Law
¶55

Another way the US could help is by amending entity law. Entity law has not
evolved with the globalization of economies and protects TNCs from liability, which was
not its original intent. TNCs are organized in “multi- tiered corporate structures
consisting of a dominant parent corporation, sub-holding companies, and scores or
hundreds of subservient subsidiaries scattered around the world.”161 The 2002 World
Investment report estimates that there are 65,000 multinational corporation groups with
more than 850,000 foreign subsidiaries and affiliates. 162
¶56
The economic reality and public view of a TNC is that it is a single enterprise
because it is supported by “common control, common business purpose, economic
integration, financial and even administrative interdependence, and often common public
persona that characterize the group’s operations.”163 However, the legal reality of
multinationals is that each constituent is regarded as a “separate juridical person.”164 A
TNC is not one firm; a TNC is made up of multiple interrelated corporations that act
under common control. Entity law shields US parent corporations from liability of
subsidiaries overseas. Often, the group subsidiaries are incorporated under the laws of
the state in which it conducts business. 165 A subsidiary corporation of a TNC is a national
of the nation in which it is incorporated and subject to that nation’s laws under accepted
principles of international law. 166 Furthermore, the doctrine of limited liability of
shareholders supports the corporate juridical entity. 167
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”)
157
Rio Declaration, supra note 104 (“States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.”)
158
Eaton, supra note 3, at 281.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational Corporations Under US Law:
Conceptual and Procedural Problems (sec. IV), 50 A M. J. COMP . L. 493, 493 (Fall 2002).
162
World Investment Report, supra note 17.
163
Blumberg, supra note 161, at 493-94.
164
Id., at 493 n.3
165
Id., at 493.
166
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5, 1970). See
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¶57

Entity law not only protects public investors from liability of the parent
corporation’s obligations, it also insulates the parent corporation from liability for the
obligations of its subsidiaries. 168 The multi- tier framework cuts the chain of liability at
multiple points. Parent corporations can hide behind shields of subsidiary corporations
and avoid liability. Even when subsidiaries incur liability, they are unlikely to have
sufficient resources to shoulder the cost of repairing environmental damage. 169
¶58
Corporate juridical entity and limited liability were created for individually owned
corporations, not for multi- tiered corporate owned corporations with foreign assets. 170 In
an attempt to deal with corporate groups more adequately, US law relies on “control” and
“controlled corporations” to impose enterprise liability. 171 However, this framework
makes it difficult to impose penalties on US-based TNCs that violate human rights
overseas. Under entity law, the law treats each constituent as a separate legal person
irrespective of whether it is a US parent or a foreign subsidiary. 172 Absent special statute,
the corporate group does not exist for legal purposes. 173 Each constituent is directly liable
only for the conduct that is traceable to its own officers, directors, and employees. 174
¶59
In some cases, vicarious liability can be applied to the parent corporation based on
equitable piercing the veil jurisprudence, agency law, or some concept of enterprise
law. 175 This, however, presents considerable difficulties as US courts must obtain in
personam jurisdiction of the foreign subsidiaries of US-based corporations, based on the
relationship of the subsidiary to parent. 176 As a result, vicarious liability has thus far
played little or no role in international human rights litigation. 177
¶60
Nevertheless, there exist

also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 212 (1987).
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Germany, 12 IN PUB. INT ’L 57, 63 n.51 (1992).
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Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 986, 969 (1986) (“The traditional justification for limiting the liability of shareholders of a
corporation to their invested capital is that full exposure to the risk of business failure might discourage
shareholders from investing in socially desirable but risky ventures.”).
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Blumberg, supra note 161, at 495.
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Id.
174
Id.
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Id., at 496.
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PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, chs. 3, 4, and 5 (1983 & Supp. 2001). See also Doe v. Unocal
Corp., No. 00-56603, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *67-*70 (9th Cir. 2002) (A relationship between a
parent and subsidiary is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction. “the general rule that a subsidiary and the
parent are separate entities” List requirements for piercing the veil To review a parent corporation under the
traditional “alter ego” doctrine, the plaintiff must show prima facie: “(1) that there is such unity of interest
and ownership that the separate personalities [of the two entities] no longer exist and (2) that failure to
disregard [their separate entities would result in fraud or injustice.” Read for more quotes.); Kingston Dry
Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929) (Need consensual consent of P
and A for A to act on P’s behalf regardless of benefit to P (Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (T.D. No.
2, 2001). This consent is generally lacking in parent/subsidiary relationships).
177
Blumberg, supra note 161, at 495.
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at least three fact patterns that support disregard of entity status under
most state standards: (1) gross undercapitalization; (2) a nominally
separate subsidiary that functions as an integrated part of the parent
corporation’s operations or production processes or that otherwise serves
in an agency relationship to the parent; and (3) firms in which the separate
entity status has been disregarded or misrepresented, as where a nominally
separate entity is identified, by trade name or otherwise with an affiliated
or parent entity. 178
If the US continues to amend entity law to adapt to the current economic situation, TNCs
would be less able to avoid liability and as a result adopt more environmentally
responsible practices.
3. The Alien Tort Claims Act
¶61

The Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) provides a third solution for claimants
against US-based TNCs. The ATCA grants federal courts “original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the US.”179 The ATCA was recently used for human rights claims 180 and even
more recently for claims against TNCs for environmental destruction. 181 However, the
Supreme Court recently restricted the use of the ATCA to the narrow range of violations
the ATCA was intended for in 1789. 182
¶62
As the international community has started to turn towards the idea of corporate
accountability as a means to deter environmental destruction and human rights violations
and to provide monetary damages for environmental cleanup and victim compensation,
TNCs have found themselves in US courts under the ATCA, accused of environmental
destruction and degradation by subsidiaries. 183 Such cases act as litmus tests for the US
judiciary’s mood regarding liability of TNCs to people and the environment and indicate
a gradual acceptance of corporate accountability.
¶63
Because of the on- going and often severe environmental destruction corporations
can cause, one can predict that the new defendant – the corporation – will surface more
and more frequently in courts throughout the world. Plaintiffs are introducing corporate
defendants to the US courts using the Alien Torts Claims Act in cases like Wiwa v. Royal
178

Richard B. Stewart & Bradley M. Campbell, Lessons from Parent Liability Under CERCLA, 6 NAT .
RESOURCES ENV’T 3, 7 (1992).
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180
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almost two centuries of dormancy).
181
See Anastasia Khokhryakova, Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.: Liability of a Private Actor for an
International Environmental Tort Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 9 COLO. J. INT ’L ENVTL. L. POL’Y 463,
466 (1998).
182
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004). Alvarez-Machain v. U.S., 331 F.3d 604, (9th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, Berellez v. Alvarez-Machain, 522 U.S. 814, (1997), appeal after remand, AlvarezMachain v. U.S, 266 F.3d 1045, (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, Alvarez-Machain v. U.S., 331 F.3d 604, (9th Cir.
2003), and cert. granted, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 2003 WL 22251320 (2003).
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US: Jota v. Texaco, Inc. 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998) (Newman, J.), rev’g Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,
945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (ATCA) on remand, 139 F. Supp. 2d 139 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y.
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Dutch Shell Petroleum Co.184 and Aguinda v. Texaco.185 However, the US courts
dismissed both cases for lack of jurisdiction. 186
¶64
Such decisions highlight the two- faced nature of the ATCA. On the one hand it
may serve the interests of nations more closely linked to the TNC or the plaintiffs.
Aguinda for example provides Ecuador the opportunity to impose liability on Texaco for
destruction of the environment and endangering its citizens. On the other hand, it
provides a loophole for US courts to back out of a difficult situation gracefully. The
reality is that oil TNCs have a lot of financial resources and political clout in the US and
can use this influence to prevent cases being heard in US courts.
¶65
Even if US courts find a more appropriate forum, the jurisdiction change will likely
affect the plaintiffs negatively. In Aguinda, Texaco agreed “to subject itself to the
jurisdiction of Ecuador’s courts, effectively conceding that the case would go to trial
somewhere.”187 Texaco however, interpreted the jurisdiction instructions in the narrowest
way possible and agreed to litigate only the “individual damages suffered by the 70
named plaintiffs.”188 Thus, 99% of Texaco’s victims were left outside Ecuador’s court
doors and Texaco’s potential liability is now only a miniscule percentage of the one
billion US dollars of estimated damages. 189 Moreover, it prevents all the victims from
joining together because there is no class action in Ecuador. 190
¶66
Like the Ecuadorian plaintiffs in Aguinda, the Nigerian plaintiffs in Wiwa brought
an environmental claim under the ATCA; the environmental abuses and health issues are
very similar. However, the environmental claims passed through the US courts with no
ruling. Thus, even before the recent reigning in of the ATCA, foreign plaintiffs could
only use the ATCA as a short-term solution to bring large-scale environmental torts to
US courts as international law develops. 191
IV. CONCLUSION
¶67

The link between a healthy environment and human rights is undeniable. Current
international human rights law and environmental law are not able to effectively protect
humans and the environment from man- made environmental destruction. Furthermore,
as the result of globalization, TNCs are one of the largest contributors to environmental
destruction but are not liable for environmental destruction or the negative impacts the
destruction may have on humans under current international law. A universally
recognized right to a healthy environment and increased corporate accountability would
184
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Conceptual and Procedural Problems, 50 A M. J. COMP . L. 493, 508 (2002).
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185

208

Vol. 4:1]

Alison Shinsato

encourage TNCs to conduct business in less environmentally destructive manner and, as
a result, protect human rights.
¶68
There is an international trend towards recognizing the right to a healthy
environment and towards increased corporate accountability. However, this movement
will take time, as the global economy is currently structured around economic efficiency,
and adjustments must be made to incorporate human, economic, and environmental
interests. Furthermore, definitions and standards need to develop into unambiguous,
enforceable mechanisms. 192 In the meantime, development and enforcement of domestic
environmental laws and use of international human rights laws and US laws can
encourage the trend to accelerate towards an actual right to a healthy environment and
universal corporate accountability.
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